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Secure and Flexible Global File Sharing
Abstract
Sharing of files is a major application of computer networks, with examples ranging from LAN-based
network file systems to wide-area applications such as use of version control systems in distributed
software development. Identification, authentication and access control are much more challenging in
this complex large-scale distributed environment. In this paper, we introduce the Distributed Credential
Filesystem (DisCFS). Under DisCFS, credentials are used to identify both the files stored in the file system
and the users that are permitted to access them, as well as the circumstances under which such access
is allowed. As with traditional capabilities, users can delegate access rights (and thus share information)
simply by issuing new credentials. Credentials allow files to be accessed by remote users that are not
known a priori to the server. Our design achieves an elegant separation of policy and mechanism which is
mirrored in the implementation. Our prototype implementation of DisCFS runs under OpenBSD 2.8, using
a modified user-level NFS server. Our measurements suggest that flexible and secure file sharing can be
made scalable at a surprisingly low performance cost.
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Abstract

that flexible and secure file sharing can be made
scalable at a surprisingly low performance cost.
~
~ Filesystems,
~
access
~ control,~
Sharing of files is a major application of computer networks, with examples ranging from n u s t Management, KeyNote, OpenBSD, creLAN-based network file systems to wide-area ap- dentials.
plications such as use of version control systems
in distributed software development. Identification, authentication and access control are much 1 IntrOduction
more challenging in this complex large-scale distributed environment.
The widespread use of the Internet demonstrates
In this paper, we introduce the Distributed the importance of information sharing. This
Credential Filesystem (DisCFS). Under DisCFS, widespread use has also spurred a shift from its
credentials are used to identify both the files original use as an open network where informastored in the file system and the users that are tion was freely available, towards one where varpermitted to access them, as well as the circum- ious organizations and users wish to share instances under which such access is allowed. AS formation under some (often restrictive) policy.
with traditional capabilities, users can delegate It has proven very difficult, in practice, to make
access rights (and thus share information) sim- even the simplest policies scalable and secure. In
ply by issuing new credentials. Credentials allow many respects, this is due to both the complexfiles to be accessed by remote users that are not ity of the distributed environment and the need
known a pm'ori to the server. Our design achieves to specify and enforce global policies on informaan elegant separation of policy and mechanism tion sharing.
which is mirrored in the implementation.
In this paper we present a system that alOur prototype implementation of IlisCFS lows file sharing to be performed between users
runs under OpenBSD 2-83 using a ~ ~ ~ o d i fuseri e d of different domains without the intervention of
level NFS server- Our rmasurements suggest the administrators of their systems. The system
hi^ work was supported by DARPA under contrXt stores access permissions on special certificates
F39502-99-1-0512-MOD P0001.
that are issued by users. For example, if Alice

~

wants to read Bob's paper, Bob only has to issue
the appropriate credential and send it to Alice
(e.g., via email).
We will show that this simple mechanism is
secure and scalable. Further, by requiring the
cooperation of only the users involved in the file
exchange, this mechanism offers great flexibility and low administrative overheads. Access to
the files may be monitored by the system and
the entity issuing the requests may be identified
through its public key. Mechanisms for restricting access or imposing access controls are also
provided.
We have integrated our access mechanism with
a user-level NFSv2 server running on many Unix
systems including OpenBSD 2.8 [2]. The performance measurements collected by running common file related benchmarks indicate that our
approach is very efficient. We endeavor to eventually offer this access mechanism as part of the
standard NFS authentication framework.
Organization The paper is organized into six
further sections. The next section provides a
more complete motivation for our system. Section 3 discusses related work. Sections 4 and 5
describe our design and implementation under
the OpenBSD operating system. Section 6 evaluates the system using both micro- and macre
benchmarks. Finally Section 7 concludes the paper with a summary of our results and our future
plans.

2

Motivation

Existing systems have several major shortcomings in when used to carry out information sharing tasks:
First, traditional user authentication implies

that the user is known to the system, before file
requests can be processed. However, the commonly used information access model on the Web
is that browsers can download pages from Web
servers without prior registration (i.e., anonymously).
Second, file and directory permissions are inherited from multi-user computer operating systems. Sharing is achieved by either account sharing (which is extremely ill-advised, as it defeats
accountability) or through the use of group access permissions on files and directories. However, group permissions assume the intervention
of the system administrator for creating the user
accounts, and adding the appropriate users to
the correct groups. Such permissions lack flexibility and granularity, and perhaps most important, extensibility: there is no way of adding
new permissions if the existing ones prove inadequate.
The third and most important shortcoming
is the extensive administrative intervention required for file sharing to work, such as password
and group password files. Where users belong to
a common organization this is not a severe problem. Yet, if users from separate organizations
wish to share files, the administrative complexity rapidly blooms into impossibility.
A typical example is as follows: Bob, a salesman, would like some clients to be able to have
access to advance information about a product. Since the information is not intended to be
widely available, Bob will have to place the literature in a restricted part of the corporate Web
site and make arrangements so that only the designated clients have access to the material. The
traditional way of doing things implies that accounts and passwords are created and handed
over to the users. A more sophisticated way of
achieving the same goal would be to use X.509 [7]

There should be no involvement of the adcredentials for user authentication. While this
ministrators in the process of allowing exterapproach addresses some of the well-known senal users access to files in the system. The
curity problems of password authentication, it
users themselves should be able to authorize
leaves much to be desired in terms of flexibility
and required administrative intervention.
access to files by external users.
For example, accounts must still be set up on
Apart horn the actual files, the system
the server, placing additional burdens on the adshould maintain as little additional state as
ministrators who now must maintain yet another
possible.
list of users. The other problem relates to the actual management of permissions that are given
Delegation is extremely important for the
to these credentials; Bob will have to go through
operation of the system, since there is alhis client list and tell the administrators who can
ready an implicit delegation of access auaccess what, thus generating an access list that
thority from the administrators to the local
matches credentials to permissions. While this
users and from the local users to external
approach may work for small groups of clients,
users.
it does not scale well.
The file access conditions must be flexible
To have effective sharing of information while
and expandable. In any case there should
maintaining control over who has access requires
be no constrains by the system as to what
that a number of requirements must be met. For
conditions
may be imposed for access.
convenience, we distinguish internal and external users. Internal users are those who have acThe access mechanism should work for both
counts on the system. These users can create
centralized servers and in a distributed enfiles and assign access permissions to them. Exvironment where the files are stored in multernal users do not have accounts and are othtiple servers.
erwise unknown to the system. In our previous
example Bob would be an internal user, while his
Before we continue with the description of the
clients would be external users. We assume that
Distributed Credential File System (DisCFS),
the number of local users is minute compared to
which was designed and implemented to meet
the number of external users. With this definithe listed requirements, we will discuss previous
tion in mind, the requirements are as follows:
work done in the area of wide area file sharing.
Default policy. The administrator should be
able to specify the default access policies for 3 Related Work
the entire system. Since these vary between
sites, the system should not make assump- Network file sharing is an area that has attracted
a lot of attention given the need for informations.
tion exchange. The explosion in the growth of
Scaling. The system should be able to cope the Internet over the past several years, and the
with large numbers of files and even larger projections that the growth will continue at a
number of users accessing those files.
similar pace, makes file sharing an even more

important issue. There are however a number of may not be available during office hours.
problems in the proposed and already existing
WebFS is part of the larger WebOS[17]project
at UC Berkeley. It implements a network file
sharing mechanisms.
system on top of the HTTP protocol. WebFS
relies on user level HTTP servers, used to trans3.1 File Systems
fer data, along with a kernel module that imNetwork file systems, like NFS and AFS [16,101 plements the file system. Access control lists
are the most popular and widespread mecha- (ACLs) are associated with each file that enunisms for sharing files in tight administration do- merate users who have read, write, or exemains. However, crossing administrative bound- cute permission on individual files. Users are
aries creates numerous administrative problems uniquely identified by their public keys. We have
(e.g., merging distinct Kerberos [14] realms or taken a more general and scalable approach in
NIS domains).
that there is no need for ACLs since each creEncrypting file systems like CFS [3] place dential is sufficient to identify both the users and
great emphasis on maintaining the privacy of the their privileges.
user information by encrypting the file names
The system that is most closely related to
and their contents. The limitation of such sys- our work is the secure file system, or SFS
tems is that sharing is particularly difficult to im- [12]. SF'S introduces the notion of self-certifging
plement; the file owner must somehow commu- pathnamesfile names that effectively contain
nicate the secret encryption key for the file to all the appropriate remote server's public key. In
the users that wish to access it. Even then, tra- this way SFS needs no separate key manageditional access controls must still be used to en- ment machinery to communicate securely with
force access restrictions (e.g., read-only, append- file servers. Our DisCFS goes a step further. It
only, immutable file, etc.). Our system assumes uses credentials to identify both the files stored
that the server is trustworthy, so that the files in the file system and the users that are percan be stored in clear text. CFS-like encryption mitted to access them, as well as the circummechanisms may still be used on top of DisCFS. stances under which such access is allowed. FurThe concept of credential-based access control thermore, users can delegate access rights simply
appears also in the Exokernel. [13]. In this sys- by issuing new credentials, providing a natural
tem, users can create new capabilities at will, and very scalable way of sharing information.
but the new capability must be dominated by
an existing one. This is similar to our chains
3.2 Other Protocols
of certificates, but is rather limited by the fact
that permissions are hardwired into the system, To share files across wide area networks a numthe hierarchical capability tree may be up to ber of protocols have been deployed, the most
8 levels deep, and the access-list based control commonly used ones being FTP and HTTP
mechanism is inflexible. In our system, certifi- [15, 81. Anonymous FTP, where there is no need
cate chains can be of arbitrary length, and the for authentication, offers total flexibility since
access policy can consider factors such as time- any user can download or upload files to FTP
of-day, so that, for example, leisure-related files servers. Similarly in the Web architecture, ac-
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Figure 1: Delegation of privileges, from the
administrator to Bob, and then to Alice.

cess is either anonymous or subject to some sort
of ad-hoc authentication mechanism. This configuration is useful only in the case where file
content is non-critical. In the case where authentication is required, the flexibility is reduced to
an absolute minimum. The only users allowed to
access the server, in that case, are users that are
already known to the system. This, as is the case
with existing network file systems, limits the collaboration possibilities only between users in the
same administration domain.

4
4.1

DisCFS Design
System Architecture

The basic principle behind DisCFS is Trust Management [5, 6, 41. Trust Management dispenses
with unique names as an indirect means for performing access control. Instead, it uses a direct
binding between a public key and a set of authorizations. This results in an extremely decentralized authorization system that is flexible enough

to cope with a large variety of authentication
scenarios.
Rather than having users authenticated by
the system and then checking access lists to see
whether their requests should be honored or not,
our system is based entirely on keys and authorizations. User requests are signed by the user's
key and must be accompanied by other credentials that form a chain of trust linking the user's
key to a key that is trusted by the system. In
our first example in Section 1,we looked at Bob's
predicament in trying to allow his clients access
to internal files. Utilizing a trust management
system, the server would trust only the administrator's key. Bob will be given a credential that
binds Bob's key with the files in question and is
signed by the administrator. The credential may
allow Bob read and write access to the files.
If Bob then wishes Alice to be able to only read
these files, he will simply need to create a new
credential which will grant Alice's key read access to the files. Alice will issue a request signed
by her key. If Alice's request is to be honored by
the system, it has to be accompanied by Bob's
credential. This credential forms a link between
the external user (Alice) and the internal user
(Bob). Bob's own credential (issued by the administrator) must also be available, to link the
internal user to the administrator. Thus, Alice's
request must be accompanied by both credentials in order to be granted (see Figure 1). Credential caching may be used to reduce the number of credentials that have to be exchanged.
It is interesting to observe that in DisCFS the
traditional problem of credential (or certificate)
revocation is fairly straightforward to address:
since the credentials related to a specific file have
to be examined by the DisCFS server where the
file is stored, revocation (especially if it is infrequent) can be done by notifying the server about
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Figure 2: Client establishes IPsec connection
with DisCFS server.

Figure 3: Client sends file-related credentials
to the DisCFS server; file becomes visible to
client.

bad keys or credentials. If the credentials are relatively short-lived, the server need only remember such information for a short period of time.
In order to be able to express access rights
and the diverse conditions under which these are
granted, we need some form of policy definition store information about every Person or
language. In our system we use the Keynote that may need to retrieve a file. We also provide
Our users with the ability to propagate access to
trust management system [4] for this purpose.
the files by simply passing on (delegating) their
rights to other users. In this way users pass cre4.2 KeyNote in DisCFS
dentials rather than passwords, thus allowing the
The basic service provided by the KeyNote sys- system to associate access requests with keys and
tem is compliance checking; that is, checking also to be able to reconstruct the authorization
whether a proposed action conforms to policy. path from the administrator to the user making
Actions in KeyNote are specified as a set of the request. The system may not know that Alname-value pairs, called an action attribute set. ice is trying to get at a file, but it can log that key
Policies are written in the KeyNote assertion lan- A (Alice's key) was used and that key B (Bob's
guage and either accept or reject action attribute key) authorized the operation.
sets presented to it (non-binary results are also
possible). Policies can be broken up and distributed as credentials, which are signed assertions that can be sent over a network and to
which a local policy can defer in making its decisions. The credential mechanism allows for arbitrarily complex graphs of trust, in which credentials signed by several entities are considered
when authorizing actions.
The advantage of using Keynote is that we no
longer need to have a priori knowledge of the
user base. Thus, the system does not need to

During the writing of this paper we encountered one obvious application of our system. The
administrator of the host that we were using for
editing the paper had failed to create a group for
all of us. Since we could not find a group that we
all belonged to, the only way for all of us to be
able to access the CVS repository with the files
was to make them world writable. If the central
server supported DisCFS then the owner of the
repository would simply need to issue read-write
certificates to all the other authors.

4.3

lPsec connection

DisCFS over NFS

As the actual network filesystem we use NFS.
This allows for easy integration into existing sysu
tems without need for extensive upgrades. MoreDisCFS Server
DisCFS Client
over, the entire scheme works with both monolithic and distributed servers. Since the servers
do not need to share information about users,
Figure 4: Client sends read requests, server
there is no synchronization overhead.
Each sends file blocks to client if policy allows the
repository is responsible for only the part of the
operation.
distributed filesystem that is stored locally and
there is no need to distribute and synchronize
authentication and access control databases (like
a A secure link between the client and the
NIS).
server is established so that subsequent
The NFS protocol is particularly suitable for
communications are secure.
our needs for the following reasons:
a

NFS is widely used and supported by numerous ~latforms.

a

The NFS protocol is portable, stable and
reliable.

a

The NFS server is available as a user level
program, so development is possible without modifications to the operating system
kernel. This is particularly useful since it
is not always possible to have access to the
operating system source.

Like NFS, the DisCFS system consists of a
client and a server. The client runs on the user
workstation and establishes a connection to the
DisCFS server. We use IPsec [l:L] for the connection between the client and the server (ashown
in Figure 2) thus ensuring the following:
a

User authentication is handled through the
creation of the IPsec Security Associations
between the client and the server.

a

All requests coming over the IPsec link can
be safely assumed to come from the autho. rized user.

When a file is stored in DisCFS, a credential
is generated containing information that allows
the future retrieval of the file contents as well
as information about the file creator. Since the
entire DisCFS closely follows NFS semantics, it
appears to the user as another mounted file system. Files for which credentials have been supplied appear under the mount point of the DisCFS file system. It is important to note that
without the credential, retrieval of the file is not
possible.
Once the user submits the necessary file eredenti& (Figure 3, the file will appear under the
DisCFS mount point using the same name it had
when its credential was created. The client may
then use file 110 requests similar to NFS (Figure
4). The system also permits the user to override
the default file name and allows files to be placed
in user-specified locations.

5

Implementation Details

We built our implementation of DisCFS by modifying the existing user-level daemon of the c r y p
tographic file system CFS [3]. In the prototype,
we replaced the encryption functionality of CFS
with the access control mechanism described in
Section 4. For our platform, we used OpenBSD
2.8 [2] since it already contains several important components of our system, such as IPsec
and KeyNote. However, the implementation is
fairly portable across different systems.
The main task in implementing DisCFS was
the integration of KeyNote credentials with NFS.
To that end, we used a modified version of the
CFS cattach utility that sets up an IPsec tunnel between the client system and the DisCFS
server and attaches the remote directory over
the IPsec connection. This allows the DisCFS
server retrieve the public key used for authentication in the IKE [9]protocol (as part of the
IPsec key establishment phase) and associate it
with a unix-style userid. Future NFS requests
are protected with IPsec, allowing the DisCFS
server to associate them with the public key of
the user.
As a result of the attach operation, the desired directory would appear under the default
DisCFS mount point (e.g., /discfs). However,
since the user has not provided a KeyNote credential assertion, the file permissions of the attached directory are set to 000 (meaning no access is granted). The file/directory ownership is
set to the userid provided during the attach operation. This value has no local significance for
the DisCFS server, and thus no prior arrangement with the system administrator is needed.
Similarly, no file ownership conflicts are possible;
the userid is irrelevant to the DisCFS server, and
is only manipulated in this way to make possible

the use of unmodified NFS clients.
To get any privileges to the attached directory
or any other files/directories in it, the user would
have to have a credential like the one shown in
Figure 5. This credential was issued by the administrator (as identified by the public key appearing in the Authorizer field) to a specific user
(as identified by the public key appearing in the
Licensees field), and contains enough information for the DisCFS server to determine what
permissions should be granted to the client system. A fileldirectory is identified by a handle,
which, in our prototype implementation, is simply the inode number of the fileldirectory on the
server. This handle is used by the DisCFS server
to locate the actual file in its local file storage.
The handle specifics need to be changed in the
future since inodes are not suitable as globally
unique identifier across a network. A possible
solution would be to build a handle from the inode number and a generation number, similar to
the 4.4 BSD NFS implementation.
The credential assertions in our implementation grant standard unix permissions. The
return values for the assertions form a partial
order of 8 combinations ( "false", "X", "W",
" W X ,"R" ,"R X ,"RW" and " RWX" ) and translate directly into the standard octal representation. Thus, in the credential of Figure 5 the user
is granted read, write, and execute access on the
testdir directory. We wrote a utility which allows a user to submit credential assertions to the
DisCFS daemon over RPC. Succesfully submitted credential assertions are added to a persistent KeyNote session. Following this operation,
the permissions of the attached directory are
changed accordingly. When read or write operations occur however, the KeyNote is consulted
again on whether the specific requests should be
granted; thus, the DisCFS server does not have

Authorizer: 1~dsa-hex:3081de0240503ca3b98b754259d8b3bdd6ed396O~~
Licensees: 1'dsa-hex:308lde02405be60a70c532le7fd20fd4dOd2a4f611
Conditions:
(app-domain == LIDisCFS"
) &&
(HANDLE == "666240") -> "RWX" ;
Comment :
"testdir"
signature: "sig-dsa-shal-hex:302e021500eebl5aflal0980017164911
Figure 5: KeyNote credential granting user miltchev access to directory testdir. The keys and
signatures have been truncated in the interest of readability.

to trust the client to enforce the file permissions.
To improve performance, we use a cache of requested operations and policy results.
It should also be noted that some of the procedures defined by the NFS protocol do not make
semantic sense for our implementation. For example, since access control is managed through
credential assertions the setattr procedure becomes superfluous. The careful reader will also
notice that there is a problem with the create and mkdir procedures. A user could create a file in the attached directory since he has
read, write, and execute access. However, he
would not be able to access the newly created
file since he would not have a credential assertion for it. Thus, we had to add our own
procedures that upon successfull creation of a
file/directory return a credential with full access
to the creator of the file. The owner can then
issue other credentials further delegating access
to this fileldirectory.

6

Experimenta1 Evaluation

While the architectural discussion is largely
qualitative, some estimates of the system performance are useful. With a design such as this,
the most useful data would be system bench-

Alice
450MHz lntel PI11

Server

128MB SDRAM
Quantum Fireball CTlO

100Mbps Ethernet

I

Bob

Client

4OOMHz lntel PI1
256MB SDRAM

Figure 6: Experimental setup. Alice is the machine that hosts the server and Bob is used as
the client. Local file system experiments were
performed on Alice.

marks for applications in distributed environments. We performed several experiments, both
micro-benchmarks and macro-benchmarks, to
get a quantitative evaluation. The experiments
are focused on any possible performance overheads introduced by our access control mechanism.
Our test machines are x86 architecture machines running 0penBSD 2.8 and interconnected
by 100 Mbps Ethernet. More specifically, in the

two-host tests (source to sink) that explore the
network performance of our system, Alice is an
450 MHz Intel PI11 with 128MB of memory and
a Quantum Fireball CTlO 9.6GB, and serves as
the sink. Bob, the source, is a 400 MHz Intel
PI1 with 256MB of memory (see Figure 6). The
single host tests, that explore the storage performance of our system were performed on Alice.
FFS
CFS-NE
DisCFS
Our prototype system is running on Alice, with Filesystem:
Bob playing the role of the client.
Bonnie Sequential Output (Char)
In the following tables, FFS means measure- Figure 7:
Throughput (100 K/sec)
ments taken on the local file system. CFS-NE is
our base case: it is basically CFS with encryption
turned off and modified to run remotely. The
server was running on Alice and the client on
Bob. Finally DbCFS is our prototype.

The Bonnie benchmark [I] was used in order
to evaluate the performance when writing and
reading a very large file (100MB). Figures 7, 8,
and 9 present results for single-character writes,
block writes and re-writes respectively. The results for single character reads and block reads
are presented in Figures 10 and 11. The performance advantage of the local file system (FFS)
comes as no surprise. However, this benchmark
demonstrates that the read and write performance of CFS-NE and Dis CFS is virtually identical. Hence, we can conclude that the overhead incurred by the KeyNote credential lookups
when using cached policy results is minimal.

Filesystem:

0 FFS

CFSNE

a DisCFS

Figure 8: Bonnie Sequential Output (Block)

counts the number of lines, words and bytes.
The test was conducted with a cache size of 128
policy results. The results are presented in Figure 12. As with the micro-benchmarks, CFS-NE
and DisCFS exhibit practically identical performance characteristics.

7

Conclusions

There are three major contributions of this paper.
First, we have introduced the idea of a comTo test file system search performance we used pletely credential-based mechanism for authena simple script that goes through every .c and tication and access control of files. We argue
.h file of the OpenBSD kernel source code and that this design is a fundament a1 improvement,

Filesystem:

FFS

CFS-NE

DisCFS

Figure 10: Bonnie Sequential Input (Char)

Filesystem:

FFS

CFS-NE @ DisCFS

Figure 9: Bonnie Sequential Output (Rewrite)

as it completely separates the policy for controlling the file (i.e., its associated users and access
rights) from the access control mechanism used
by the underlying file storage. As we have argued in the paper, this gives DisCFS advantages
in flexibility, security and scalability relative to
previous designs.
Second, we have described our DisCFS prototype, which is based on OpenBSD 2.8 and CFS
[3]. The implementation uses the KeyNote trust
management system as the basis for robust scalable credential management. It supports common unix file operations. The prototype shows
that it is remarkably easy to both implement
and deploy DisCFS, as it uses components such
as NFS and IPsec, which already exist in most
common operating systems. Furthermore, the
traditional semantics of the unix filesystem can
easily be supported by DisCFS.

Filesystem: 0 FFS

CFS-NE

DisCFS

Figure 11: Bonnie Sequential Input (Block)

Third, we evaluated the system's performance
with a set of micro-benchmarks which measured
primitive operations in the context of our access
control mechanism. This demonstrated that DisCFS was constrained by the same factors, such
as remote RPC times, which plague other distributed systems. In a second evaluation, we
compared the performance of DisCFS to CFS, a
more "macro" benchmark, and showed that the
performance impact of DisCFS 's enhancements
is low.
Among the directions we will pursue for future work are investigation of new file sharing
policies for unusual scenarios, such as the un-
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vacy, pages 164-173. IEEE Computer Society Press, Los Alamitos, 1996.

. .. . . ..

[6] M. Blaze, J. Feigenbaum, and M. Strauss.
Compliance Checking in the PolicyMaker
Trust-Management System. In Proc. of the
Financial Cryptography '98, Lecture Notes
in Computer Science, vol. 1465, pages 254274. Springer, Berlin, 1998.

Filesystem:

-

C]

FFS

CFS-NE

DisCFS

[7] CCITT. X. 509: The Directory Authentication Framework. International Telecommunications Union, Geneva, 1989.

Figure 12: Filesystem Search

trusted users characteristic of the WWW, and
attempting to rigorously quantify the scalability
advantages offered by DisCFS.
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